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ABSTRACT
Energy communities and peer-to-peer energy exchanges
are expected to play an important role in the energy transi-
tion. In this context, the blockchain approach can be em-
ployed to foster this decentralized energy market. In [1],
we evaluated several designs that should allow a Distribu-
tion System Operator (DSO) to accept peer-to-peer energy
exchanges supported by this technology. This acceptance
is based on criteria such as a strong link with the whole-
sale/retail market, the resilience of the consensus to ap-
prove a block, the accuracy, traceability, privacy and secu-
rity of the proposed schemes. We concluded that proof-of-
stake (PoS), where the choice of node that creates a block is
based on a measure of its wealth, is the only method to ful-
fill these requirements. In the present paper, we clarify the
identification and estimation of bidding models to ensure
that the PoS that we are developing is a correct response
to two major issues with the PoS methodology, namely the
concentration of wealth and the ”nothing to stake” issue.
1 INTRODUCTION
Since the arrival of Bitcoin [2] and its subsequent success
as a cryptocurrency, the blockchain has emerged as a dis-
ruptive factor in many areas, starting with banking trans-
actions. With blockchain 2.0 and the future version 3.0 al-
lowing the use of automated transactions, the energy sec-
tor is probably one of the next sectors to be impacted by
this new way of performing verification and authentication
of transactions between parties. Blockchains can be re-
garded as decentralized and distributed ledgers that keep
track of any type of transaction. This move towards the
blockchain is likely to accelerate with the emergence of
energy communities where prosumers (customers having
their own generation asset) will want to exchange their sur-
plus generated energy with their neighbours and / or with
nearby companies / institutions.
To guarantee the rights and duties of each party and to
make the necessary link to the wholesale market, these ex-
changes must be supervised by a neutral metering party
such as the distribution system operator (DSO) as provided
for in French law [3] on collective self-consumption or in
the E-Cloud project [4]). After this introduction, the paper
will be structured as follow. We first present the PoS pro-
posed for energy communities, then state the problem of
interest in this paper, summarize the key characteristics of
proposed PoS, and finally present some statistical results
of different bidding models before concluding.
2 PROOF OF STAKE PROPOSAL
2.1 Use cases
We use a generalised energy community definition that
serves as a basis for the remainder of this paper. It is de-
fined by:
• a limited geographical area (e.g. same street, or same
residential block, same business zone);
• at least one connection point between the community
and the public grid (in an extreme case, each partici-
pant is connected to the public grid);
• the share of generated electricity allocated to one par-
ticipant is recorded in its own virtual generation meter
• the market face meter gives each measurement step
(i.e. 15 minutes). Obviously, this must also be the
case for the consumption and (virtual) generation me-
ters.
• generations units that are installed in the same geo-
graphical area as the community are considered as
common asset(s) to the community (virtual power
plant)
The link with the retail/wholesale energy market for a par-
ticular participant is created by a computed market face
meter. This computed market face meter logs the differ-
ence between its consumption meter and its virtual gen-
eration meter. In the cases studied in this paper, we only
record the electricity generation in the blockchain and the
share of it amongst the different parties, and the DSO deals
with the consumption separately. The pricing of this gen-
erated energy is beyond the scope of this paper.
2.2 Proof of stake
The proposed design of the transactional model combined
with the concept of cryptometer ensures (see [1]) that, at
least at their creation, kilowatt-hours are actually produced
by generators within the community. As mentioned pre-
viously, given the fact that the virtual generation meters
are a ledger for each customer in the blockchain and must
be compared with traditional consumption meters, a block
needs to be created exactly at every market step. There-
fore, the simple consensus algorithm illustrated in Table 1
is adopted and will run at each market time step.
To select a miner node at step 3, as explained in [1], we
recommended to use the proof-of-stake (PoS) method. In
this method, the miner is chosen based on a measure of
its wealth. The greater the wealth of a node, the larger its
chance of being selected. The PoS method could be a good
way to ensure that a block is created exactly at each market
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Table 1: Blockchain consensus algorithm.
1. New transactions are broadcast to all nodes;
2. Each node creates a block with all the valid new trans-
actions;
3. At each market period Ti a node is randomly selected
and broadcasts its block;
4. Other nodes check the validity of the block and, if they
agree, increment their chain;
5. If the majority of nodes agree, the block is definitively
approved.
Table 2: Proposed miner selection algorithm.
LetK be the set of nodes willing to support the chain at time Ti.
1. Determine the wealth of each candidate miner. We choose
the following criteria to define the wealth (or stake) of a node
k ∈K :








• E is the voting token corresponding to a subset of the
volume of kilowatt-hours in the previous transactions
(more kilowatt-hours increase the probability to gen-
erate the next block)
• A is an age measure of the previous block: how old
is the last block created by a miner, how big is the
probability to create the next one.
• R is a reputation measure: miners that have already
created more blocks than the other nodes will have a
highest probability to be selected for the next block
creation.
The weights α , β and γ are weights contractually agreed on
within the community.
2. Randomize. Generate of a random number Uk for every can-
didate k with a uniform distribution in ]0,1].
3. Output. The selected node has the maximum ratio Wk/Uk:




time step Ti. In addition, it requires less computational
power than the other method called Proof of Work.
The PoS algorithm for our use case is described in Table 2.
To implement this method, we create a special set of trans-
actions using a voting token and a selection algorithm (cf.
[1]). This algorithm operates as an auction marketplace:
candidate miners place their offer in the form of a part of
their voting tokens and send these to the actual miner. They
can do this for a period between two moments called ”can-
didates gate opening” for the launch of the selection and
”candidates gate closure” for the end. After the compu-
tation of (2), the selected node is communicated to all the
nodes by the creation of a transaction that sends all the vot-
ing token offered to the winner.
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
3.1 Nothing to stake issue
As summarized in [5], the blockchain is ”an open, dis-
tributed ledger that can record transactions between two
parties efficiently and in a verifiable and permanent way.”
Every node running the blockchain owns locally the whole
ledger and validates each block. But it could be that, e.g.
due to transmission latency, a node does not have the same
number of blocks as the other nodes. There is a consensus
when several nodes (usually most nodes on the network)
have the same blocks in their locally-validated blockchain.
The longest blockchain is considered to be the correct
chain. As a method to determine the node that is authorized
to create a block, PoS may not promote enough consen-
sus. To be more specific, a block must point to some previ-
ous block, normally the block at the end of the previously
longest chain. In a chain-based PoS, most blocks normally
converge into a single constantly growing chain. But, as
the PoS requires relatively little computation power, it is
not costly to continue to promote divergent chains by cre-
ating as many blocks as there are forks. As a consequence,
it would be impossible to decide which chain is the cor-
rect one. This problem is known as the nothing to stake
issue. This issue is also referenced as the Byzantine gener-
als problem.
3.2 Concentration of wealth
An attacker that controls most of the wealth can exclude
and modify the ordering of transactions, hence:
• reverse transactions that he sends while he is in con-
trol (double spend risk);
• prevent some transactions from gaining any confirma-
tion and, for instance, ask a ransom to do it correctly.
For these reasons, it is essential that the PoS approach leads
to a balanced distribution of the wealth and avoids that
only a few nodes may have the possibility to be selected
as miner. Nevertheless, it is worth to note that an attacker
cannot:
• arbitrarily create energy or voting tokens;
• send energy or voting tokens he does not own;
• modify transactions already forged in block;
• prevent transactions from being sent at all.
4 KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRO-
POSED APPROACH
Regarding the issues above, the proposed PoS is mainly
characterized by the voting token and the auction mecha-
nism.
The auction mechanism is a good answer to the nothing to
stake issue because it is creating a new way to ensure the
consensus. The correct chain is the longest chain. Within
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the auction mechanism it is always possible to trace which
node won and has been selected as miner to create a spe-
cific block. Hence, a local blockchain owned by a node that
contains block(s) that is (are) not created by the winner of
the auction mechanism is not valid. To facilitate this trace-
ability, the information about the winner of the auction and
the actual miner are put in the header of the block.
Solving the concentration of wealth issue is more difficult.
We analyze this issue using game theory. To simplify the
problem, we consider that, during the auction period, each
player sends only once its bid and does not have the time
to react to the other players bids. So no player knows its
position. The probability for a player k to win is:
Wk
∑ j∈K \k Wj
.
This impacts the utility function for each player k. We can
consider that we face an imperfect information Bayesian
game leyton2008essentials. One auction in our use case
can be modeled as:
G = (N,A,H,Z,χ,ρ,σ , I,Θ, p,u) (3)
where:
• N is a set of n players; this information is known and
is equal all to the possible nodes/candidates able to
send a bid
• A is a set of actions; for the sake a simplicity, we con-
sider that the possible actions are:
– no participation
– participation by sending ek = xk% of the voting
token owned by the player k
• H is a set of nonterminal choice knots,
• Z is a set of terminal knots disjoint from H,
• χ is the action function which assigns to each choice
knot a set of possible actions,
• ρ is the player function, which assigns to each non-
terminal knot a player k ∈ N,
• σ is the successor function, which maps a choice knot
and an action to a new choice knot
• I = (I1, ..., In) where Ik = (Ik,1, ..., Ik,sk) is an equiva-
lence relation on {h∈H : ρ(h) = k}with the property
that χ(h) = χ(h′) and ρ(h) = ρ(h′) whenever there
exists a j for which h ∈ Ik, j and h′ ∈ Ik, j
• Θ=Θ1× ...×Θn whereΘk is the type space of player
k. Regarding our use case, Θk represents the type of
game when k is the winner. Hence, there are as many
as Θ as there are n players.
• p is the common prior over type and is equal to the
probability that player k wins.
• u= (u1...un)where uk is a real value corresponding to
the utility function for player k. The utility function
for each player is:
– if player k wins: uk = ∑
N−k
j=1 e j
– if player k loses: uk =−ek
Figure 1: Illustration of G with 4 players.
Figure 1 illustrates these notions for one specific Θ type
with four candidates (meaning that there are four types,
each type corresponding to a candidate who wins). The
green dots are the nonterminal knots. The red dashed dots
represent the terminal knots, called Z1 to Z16. The blue
arrows show χ , ρ and σ . The orange dotted lines illustrate
the equivalence relation I, meaning that the player does not
know its position in the game tree and makes its selection
of the action independently of this position. To give an
example of the utility function, let us suppose that this type
on Figure 1 is when player 1 is winning and see the result
of the terminal node Z15:
Player Utility




Solving this non-cooperative game and finding its equilib-
rium point(s) are beyond the scope of this paper. Instead,
we simulate some auction rules and candidate behaviors to
determine pragmatic requirements about the auction mech-
anism. However, it is possible to see that the terminal knot
Z1 could be an equilibrium. But in this case, no block is
created because all candidates refuse to participate. The
right penalty scheme must thus be designed to discourage
players from choosing this strategy. This must be imposed
for all Θ types.
5 SIMULATIONS
5.1 Definition of the simulations
The blockchain is at risk when the number of candi-
dates/players is low because it is easier for a node to gain
the majority of the wealth. The minimum number of par-
ticipant is four. To evaluate correctly the auction mecha-
nism, we need to assess it for a stable amount of voting
token (no extra creation due to transaction). Within this
condition, if the auction mechanism leads to a concentra-
tion of the wealth or to reduce the number of candidates,
then the auction mechanism need to be adapted. In order
to test it, we mimic different players behavior and bidding
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strategies. We have developed several sets of simulations
that have the following in common. There are 4 candidates
at the start of the simulation, named: A, B, C and G. Each
candidate k begins with the same amount of E0,k = 100E.
Et,k is the volume of voting token for k before a turn t +1.
At each turn, a candidate sends et,k = Et,k.xt,k to the miner.
xt,k is a random percentage in [0,100%] and et,k is an inte-
ger. Finally, 1,000 turns are played.
In a first set of simulations (sc1), Wt,k is only a function of
Et,k. In the other simulations, we have introduced properly
the age and the reputation in Wt,k, namely as recommend





sc2 takes into account the age (A) and the reputation (R)
sc3 compared to sc2, the amount of ek is free and there is
a floor limit such that when the remaining tokens for
a candidate is bellow this limit, he sends only 1 token.
sc4 compared to sc3, the amount of ek is bounded above.
We have also defined different player types. Simulations
are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Simulations and player types. All the players in a
set of simulations are of the same type.
Sim. Type ek limited Floor
sc2 risk-seeking: no no
sc3 risk-neutral: no yes,20%
sc4 risk-averse: max 40%EkTi−1 yes,20%
5.2 Simulation results
To evaluate the players behavior and the auction rules, we
count the number of times a candidate wins an auction and
we check after 1000 turns if all candidates are still active
(i.e that E1000,k > 0 ). If it is not the case, we look at which
turn the number of candidate drops (cf. Table 4). Consider-
Table 4: Simulation results.
simul. turns won by Candidates still active
A B C G E1000,k > 0 stop at turn
sc1 17 485 4 494 no 70
sc2 489 16 488 7 no 55
sc3 493 14 491 2 no 45
sc4 173 337 188 302 yes > 1000
ing these results, we tried to increase the level of the floor
for the set of simulation sc3 without gaining any strong
improvement until the floor reaches 60%.
6 CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
We propose an adaptation of the blockchain technology for
energy communities, based on a particular Proof of Stake
consensus algorithm, in order to offer an efficient and re-
silient way to support transactions within an energy com-
munity, but also to get it accepted by the wholesale mar-
ket. A first analysis using a game theory formalization and
simulations highlights three important auction rules for the
proposed PoS:
• to compute the Wealth, taking into account the Age of
the block (A) and the Reputation (R) is essential;
• penalties to every node have to be integrated if no
node stands for mining;
• when the number of candidates is low, a risk-averse
player profile could be enforced.
The topics discussed hereafter have only been touched
upon in this article and deserve further development and
validation. Upon several aspects (e.g. feasibility of a time
stamp, integration of energy losses, impact of the transac-
tion rate, etc.), the full development of the auction mech-
anism using game theory is certainly worth. Finally, we
considered that the virtual generation meter is a dead end
for transactions, but consumers may want to agree to ex-
change between each other a part of the energy recorded in
their virtual generation meter, and, by doing so, create a lo-
cal market. This can open additional security issues since
more parties can have an interest in defrauding the system
(and not only the VPP).
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